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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1997 the Supreme Court held, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor,1 that a proposed class of present and future asbestos claimants 
could not be certified as an opt-out class under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3).  The Amchem Court concluded that the claims were 
too disparate and “sprawling” to be joined in a single representative class 
action.2  Two years later, the Court decided Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,3 
again rejecting an asbestos class settlement.  In Ortiz, the Court held that 
the settlement failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(1)(B) standards for 
certification of asbestos claims against a single corporate defendant.4  
Specifically, the settling parties had failed to show, as required under 
Rule 23, that the defendant had limited funds to pay the aggregated 
claims.5  After these decisions, commentators predicted that products-
liability plaintiffs would file fewer class actions in federal court, perhaps 
moving such filings to state courts whenever possible.6 
Ortiz was decided ten years ago; enough time, one would hope, to 
enable us to begin to gauge the impact of Amchem and Ortiz on class 
action activity in the federal courts.  Most telling would be any impact on 
class certification.  Information on filings and removals does not address, 
                                                     
 ∗ The authors are senior researchers at the Federal Judicial Center.  Institutional affiliation is 
provided for purposes of identification only.  The views expressed in this Article represent the views 
of the authors and do not represent the views or positions of the Federal Judicial Center or any other 
entity in the judicial branch. 
 1. 521 U.S. 591, 622–25 (1997). 
 2. Id. at 624–28. 
 3. 527 U.S. 815, 864–65 (1999). 
 4. Id. at 851. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother 
Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Water?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1709 (2000) (asserting that “many 
class counsel have abandoned the federal courts in favor of what are perceived to be more receptive 
state court forums”). 
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directly, the decisions’ likely impact on federal class action practice.  
Even with respect to filings and removals, however, time has not stood 
still.  Since 1999, passage of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(CAFA)7 has further roiled the class action waters.  In other work, we 
have documented the impact of CAFA on diversity filings and removals 
to federal court.8  In this Article, we present additional, preliminary 
evidence on class certification drawn from the ongoing CAFA study and 
other empirical studies. 
Moreover, the last decade has seen a substantial increase in 
aggregate litigation in products-liability cases in multidistrict litigation 
(MDL) proceedings.9  This increase has led some to ask whether one 
consequence of Amchem and Ortiz has been a shift away from class 
action aggregation of mass-tort and product-liability claims and a shift 
toward MDL aggregation of such claims in the federal courts.10  
Assuming such a shift is under way, one thing is certain: civil 
proceduralists have a great deal to keep them occupied.  MDL 
aggregation—and particularly the settlement of mass-tort claims in the 
MDL context, without class certification—raises a host of important 
questions.11 
                                                     
 7. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 8. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE 
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008), http://www.fjc.gov 
/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa0408.pdf/$file/cafa0408.pdf (reporting data through June 30, 2007); see 
also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the 
Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723 (2008) 
(reporting data through June 30, 2006). 
 9. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-
District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal 3 (Univ. of Texas Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. 
Research Paper No. 147 & NYU Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 09-09, 2009), 
available at at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352646 (citing Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: 
New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L. L. 179 (2001) [hereinafter Hensler, Revisiting the Monster]; Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of 
Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883 
(2001) [hereinafter Hensler, Mass Tort Litigation]). 
 10. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client 
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519 [hereinafter 
Erichson, Beyond the Class Action] (describing the forms of nonclass mass-tort litigation and 
showing their functional similarity to class actions); Hensler, Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 9, at 
900–06 (comparing the roles of MDL consolidation and class actions in mass torts); Deborah R. 
Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic Torts, 26 REV. LITIG. 883, 893–926 
(2007) [hereinafter Hensler, Fat Lady] (tracing the role of MDL action on past and present mass-tort 
litigation); see also RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 260 (2007) 
(“As a practical matter, consolidated pretrial proceedings at the behest of the MDL Panel already 
form a setting ripe for plaintiffs’ lawyers and defendants to begin discussions about a comprehensive 
peace.”). 
 11. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community, and the Line Between, 
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 889 (2010) (addressing the difficulty of knowing whether the “procedurally 
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This Article examines the extent to which available empirical 
research supports the impressions of scholars that a shift has occurred 
from using class action procedures to using multidistrict-litigation 
procedures to manage and resolve tort litigation in the federal courts.  
This shift would transform the management of aggregate litigation from 
a system in which a judge presides over a case filed by a class 
representative in a district in which the parties have filed or removed a 
class action into one in which a judge selected by the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation presides over cases consolidated in a multidistrict 
litigation in which all (or most) parties are represented by counsel.  This 
shift would further transform the resolution of the litigation from a 
process in which a judge decides whether a proposed settlement is fair, 
reasonable, and adequate for the class into one in which counsel for the 
parties, without judicial review of the settlement, make a binding 
determination that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for 
their clients. 
Part II focuses on the class action side of the equation, examining 
filings and removals of class actions in personal-injury products-liability 
cases.  Part II then narrows the focus to the class certification 
mechanism.  It begins by summarizing the empirical studies of 
interlocutory appeals under Rule 23(f).  Early indications are that Rule 
23(f) has also led to fewer classes being certified.  Part II continues with 
an overview of changes since Ortiz, in case law, procedural rules, and the 
Manual for Complex Litigation, that have generally raised class 
certification hurdles for litigants.  Part II then examines the existing 
empirical studies of class certification.  Although not conclusive on the 
question, these studies certainly suggest a declining rate of class 
certification in the years before and after Ortiz.  Without class 
certifications, parties are forced to look to other procedures for managing 
and resolving mass litigation. 
                                                                                                                       
aggregated individuals form a sufficiently cohesive group”); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural 
Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) [hereinafter Burch, 
Procedural Justice] (stating that “[n]onclass aggregate litigation is risky for plaintiffs [because] it 
falls into the gray area between individual litigation and certified class actions”); Howard M. 
Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 979 (2010) [hereinafter 
Erichson, The Trouble] (discussing the problems with all-or-nothing settlements); Erichson, Beyond 
the Class Action, supra note 10, at 519 (stating that, “outside of class actions, the profession’s failure 
to recognize the collective nature of much litigation has left clients unprotected, and has engendered 
an ethical murkiness that leaves lawyers unsure whether they owe their loyalty to the individual or to 
the collective”); see also Silver & Miller, supra note 9 (tracing MDL organization of counsel and 
management in the Guidant, Vioxx, and Zyprexa litigations). 
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Part III changes the focus to MDL aggregation in products-liability 
proceedings, reporting first on the number of cases involved in 
aggregate-MDL proceedings in the years before and after Amchem and 
Ortiz—culminating, perhaps coincidentally, in a greater number of 
products-liability cases and MDL proceedings in recent years.  Part III 
ends with a brief overview of the size of three recent MDL nonclass 
settlements.  Based on their similarity to pre-Ortiz class settlements, 
these settlements manifest the shifting form of products-liability 
aggregation from class to nonclass settlements and raise important 
questions of procedural fairness and justice that commentators and the 
American Law Institute (ALI) have begun to address. 
II. CLASS ACTIONS 
A. Filings and Removals: 1994–2007 
In the wake of Amchem and Ortiz, the Judicial Conference Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules (“Committee”) asked the Federal Judicial 
Center (FJC) to conduct a study of federal-court class action filings and 
removals before and after those decisions.12  The Committee was 
interested in whether products-liability and other class action plaintiffs 
were avoiding the federal courts when filing class actions because of the 
perception that class certification and approval of class settlements 
would be more difficult as a result of the two decisions. 
The Amchem–Ortiz study, published in September 2002,13 did not 
conclude that parties were avoiding federal court in the wake of the 
decisions.  Specifically, it found that nonsecurities class action filings 
and removals in federal court increased steadily from 1994 to 1996, 
leveled off for six months, then increased and leveled off just before 
Amchem was decided in 1997.14  In the six-month period immediately 
following Amchem, filings and removals declined to the 1996 level and 
leveled off until Ortiz was decided.15  Then, contrary to expectations, 
nonsecurities class action filings and removals increased to 1000 per six-
month period and leveled off, with a slight dip at the end of the study 
                                                     
 12. Memorandum from Bob Niemic & Tom Willging of the Fed. Judicial Ctr. to the Advisory 
Comm. on Civil Rules 1 (Sept. 9, 2002), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/amchem.pdf/ 
$file/amchem.pdf. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 8 chart 1. 
 15. Id. 
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period.16  With respect to personal-injury class actions—the type of 
claims at issue in Amchem and Ortiz—the study found that “filings of 
personal injury class actions more than doubled from 1994 through June 
2001, including an increase during the two years or so following the 
Ortiz decision.”17  The study also found that “removals of personal injury 
and property damage class actions decreased briefly after the Amchem 
decision and increased during 2000–2001.”18  Overall, removals of such 
cases quadrupled from 1994 through June 2001.19  Not only did Amchem 
and Ortiz not have the expected effect, class action filings and removals 
appeared to move in the opposite direction by increasing after the Ortiz 
decision.20 
Since 2002, the FJC has updated its class actions research in a long-
term study of the impact of CAFA on the federal courts.21  The CAFA 
study found that, overall, diversity class action filings increased in the 
immediate aftermath of the Act’s effective date (February 18, 2005) and 
appeared to continue to increase over the post-CAFA period (through 
June 2007).22  Diversity class action removals also increased, post-
CAFA, but then followed a downward trend over the post-CAFA 
period.23  With respect to personal injury class actions, specifically, the 
CAFA study found that monthly filings and removals of diversity 
personal-injury class actions had declined, slightly, in the post-CAFA 
period, but that the decrease was not statistically significant.24  Just as 
with the Amchem–Ortiz study, the empirical results were contrary to 
expectations.  CAFA did lead to increases in other categories of diversity 
class actions in the federal courts;25 but personal-injury class actions did 
not conform to expectations. 
                                                     
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 2. 
 18. Id.  Note that removals were also expected to decline after Amchem and Ortiz because 
defendants would not want to subject their settlements to the standards articulated in the two 
decisions.  Id. at 4. 
 19. Id. at 2. 
 20. The FJC research found “a statistically significant, but short-lived, change in filings after 
the Amchem decision . . . [that] lasted through just after the Ortiz decision,” but that finding seems 
overshadowed by the post-Ortiz increase in filings that exceed the pre-Amchem trend line levels.  Id. 
at 11. 
 21. For the most recent report on filings and removals, see LEE & WILLGING, supra note 8. 
 22. Id. at 7, 21 fig.3.  The CAFA study focused on diversity class actions because the Act 
expanded the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 12 (“The average number of personal injury class actions initiated in the federal 
courts has actually dropped slightly in the post-CAFA period . . . .”). 
 25. Id. at 11–12 (describing increases in diversity contracts, consumer protection–fraud, and 
property-damage class actions in the post-CAFA period). 
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In sum, the personal-injury class action has not disappeared from the 
federal courts.26  In the wake of Ortiz, the number of such cases initiated 
in federal courts appears to have increased.  After CAFA, the number of 
such cases initiated in the federal courts appears to have remained 
steady—not increasing, as the proponents of CAFA may have hoped, but 
not decreasing, either. 
It is possible to combine the databases compiled in the two FJC 
studies of class actions to analyze class action filings and removals from 
January 1994 through June 2007 over the entire 13.5-year (or 162-
month) period.  Figure 1 displays monthly filings and removals of 
products-liability personal-injury class actions over that time span in two 
different ways.  The lighter gray line represents the number of filings and 
removals of personal-injury products-liability (PIPL) class actions as 
reported in FJC reports.  The Committee generally prefers that, in 
counting the number of class actions, the FJC count multiple class action 
filings or removals that are later consolidated, either through the MDL 
process or in an intradistrict consolidation, as a single class action.27  The 
darker line represents the total number of PIPL class actions that the FJC 
identified in the Amchem–Ortiz and CAFA studies without adjustment 
for intradistrict or MDL consolidations. 
                                                     
 26. For a discussion of another example of the survival of class actions despite adverse case 
law, see Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives: The Punitive Damage Class, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 845 
(2010). 
 27. Lee & Willging, supra note 8, at 1746–47 (2008). 
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Even a cursory glance at Figure 1 suggests that PIPL class actions 
are alive and well in the federal courts, at least in terms of filings and 
removals.  If one regresses the consolidated PIPL filings and removals on 
time, in a simple linear regression over the entire period,28 the coefficient 
for time, i.e., the slope of the line, is positive, showing an increase in 
filings and removals during the period.  The same is true if one regresses 
the total PIPL filings and removals on time.  In other words, over the 
entire period from January 1994–June 2007, PIPL class action filings and 
removals appear to have increased—slightly—and this is true for both 
the consolidated and total PIPL filings and removals.  To that extent, 
then, Amchem and Ortiz have not resulted in a decrease in PIPL class 
actions in terms of absolute numbers. 
This statement is one that we must immediately caveat.  Because we 
do not have reliable data on state court filings, we cannot address 
whether more such cases are being filed in state court than in the 1990s.  
It is possible that class action plaintiffs have fled the federal courts in 
great numbers.  We simply do not know.  Moreover, PIPL class actions 
may have increased in absolute numbers, but even an increase in absolute 
                                                     
 28. See WILLIAM S. BROWN, INTRODUCING ECONOMETRICS 257 (1991) (describing linear 
regression as a first stage in identifying trends in time series data). 
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numbers may be, at times, a relative decrease.  As will be discussed in 
Part III, other kinds of products-liability cases have seen much larger 
relative (and absolute) increases in the same period.  Nevertheless, filings 
and removals get a person only so far.  The real impact of Amchem and 
Ortiz on PIPL class actions should be seen in judicial rulings on class 
certification.  That is the subject of the next section. 
B. Class Certification 
The linchpin of the class action’s power lies not with the filing of a 
class action, but with the class certification ruling.29  In a seminal study, 
Bryant Garth of the American Bar Foundation found the class action’s 
power to be associated with “[s]uccess in certification [, which] makes it 
possible to raise the stakes through aggregation, which justifies some 
greater expenditure of attorney time on the plaintiffs’ (and defendants’) 
side.”30  A more recent FJC study concluded that “[t]he dichotomy 
between certified and noncertified cases could hardly be clearer.  A 
certification decision appears to be a turning point, separating cases and 
pointing them toward divergent outcomes.”31  Cases with a certified class 
invariably lead to class settlements, while cases without a certified class 
are either dismissed or result in settlement of the individual claims of the 
class representative, but not of the class.32  Accordingly, examining 
certification rulings might reveal more about the impact of recent 
changes in the law on class action litigation than simply examining the 
rate of filing class actions.  With that in mind, we now turn to an 
empirical examination of trends regarding class certification decisions at 
both the appellate and trial levels. 
1. Factors Other Than Amchem–Ortiz 
Case law, procedural rules, and legal commentary have all pointed 
toward restricting certification of class actions in the decade since Ortiz 
                                                     
 29. See THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., AN 
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS’ CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 49 
(2005) [hereinafter WILLGING & WHEATMAN, EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION] (finding that “data support 
the proposition that class certification is at least one of the key decisions in class action litigation”); 
Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action 
Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 648 (2006) [hereinafter 
Willging & Wheatman, Attorney Choice] (same data and finding). 
 30. Bryant G. Garth, Power and Legal Artifice: The Federal Class Action, 26 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 237, 267 (1992). 
 31. Willging & Wheatman, Attorney Choice, supra note 29, at 649. 
 32. Id. 
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was decided.  Amchem and Ortiz each imposed limits on the certification 
of class actions in the settlement context.33  In the litigation context, two 
widely cited appellate cases decided before Amchem and Ortiz—Castano 
v. American Tobacco Co.,34 and In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.35—held 
that district courts erred in certifying products-liability common-issues 
classes for trial in cases where personal-injury and damages claims of 
individual class members arguably differed considerably from each other 
and required separate proof.  In Rhone-Poulenc, an en banc Seventh 
Circuit also discussed the lack of opportunity to appeal class certification 
decisions under appellate jurisdictional rules calling for a final judgment 
as a precondition for an appeal.36  The court issued a writ of mandamus 
directing decertification of a class of hemophiliacs exposed to HIV-
contaminated blood.37  Writing for the majority, Judge Posner 
emphasized “the undue and unnecessary risk of a monumental industry-
busting error in entrusting the determination of potential multi-billion 
dollar liabilities to a single jury when the results of the previous cases 
indicate that the defendants’ liability is doubtful at best . . . .”38 
This pronouncement precipitated significant changes in the class 
certification process, including adoption of Rule 23(f) and revisions to 
Rule 23(c).  The Manual for Complex Litigation modified its approach to 
class actions based on changes in case law and Rule 23.  These changes 
must be factored into any discussion of the impact of Ortiz. 
a. Impact of Rule 23(f) 
Soon after Rhone-Poulenc, the Advisory Committee revised Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”) to add section (f), authorizing a 
permissive interlocutory appeal, allowed at the discretion of the courts of 
appeals, to review decisions granting or denying class certification.39  
The Committee noted that “[a]n order granting certification . . . may 
force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class 
action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.”40 
                                                     
 33. For a discussion of those limitations, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 
22.72–73 (2004). 
 34. 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 35. 51 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 36. Id. at 1294–95. 
 37. Id. at 1304. 
 38. Id. 
 39. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note. 
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In practice, Rule 23(f) has almost certainly contributed to the 
restriction in class action certification during the past decade.  Empirical 
research indicates that courts of appeals more often grant Rule 23(f) 
appeals when defendants seek review of an order granting class 
certification than when plaintiffs seek review of an order denying class 
certification.41  After reviewing published orders and unpublished docket 
records of Rule 23(f) petitions for appellate review of decisions to grant 
or deny class certification, attorney–researchers Sullivan and Trueblood 
concluded that “[i]n most circuits, our data suggest that the defendants’ 
petitions are granted more often.”42  Specifically, they found that 
approximately three out of four appellate rulings on class certification 
arising out of Rule 23(f) petitions concerned cases where the district 
court had granted class certification.43  Professor Richard Freer found 
strikingly similar results in a study of published opinions applying Rule 
23(f).44 
Moreover, this research suggests that Rule 23(f) interlocutory 
appeals more often result in the denial of class certification than in either 
affirming class certification or in the reversal of a denial of class 
certification.45  Again, the percentages for each outcome documented in 
the two studies are very similar.46  Combining the range of outcomes 
found in the two studies, a little more than half of the Rule 23(f) appeals 
decisions reversed class certification, while around 20% affirmed class 
certification.  Only about a quarter of interlocutory appeals concerned 
decisions denying class certification, and these were affirmed about 
twice as often as they were reversed.  Examined from the perspective of 
whether the appeal’s outcome ended with the possibility of a class being 
certified, both studies found that 71% terminated with no possibility of a 
certified class.  In both studies, only about 30% of interlocutory appeals 
affirmed class certification or allowed for the possibility of class 
certification on remand. 
                                                     
 41. Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law and Discretion in 
the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277, 286, 290 tbl.1 (2008). 
 42. Id. at 286. 
 43. Id. at 291 tbl.3 (showing that 95 of 126 (75%) Rule 23(f) appeals in which class 
certification had been ruled on dealt with cases where class certification had been granted and 31 of 
126 (25%) dealt with cases where class certification had been denied). 
 44. Richard D. Freer, Interlocutory Review of Class Action Certification Decisions: A 
Preliminary Empirical Study of Federal and State Experience, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 13, 19 chart 1 
(2007) (showing that 72.5 of 101 (72%) Rule 23(f) appeals dealt with cases where class certification 
had been granted and 28.5 of 101 (28%) Rule 23(f) appeals dealt with cases where class certification 
had been denied). 
 45. Sullivan & Trueblood, supra note 41, at 291 tbl.3. 
 46. Id. at 291 tbl. 3; Freer, supra note 44, at 19 chart 1. 
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In sum, the existing research supports the view that Rule 23(f) has 
reduced the number of cases proceeding with certified classes.47  While 
the impact of Rule 23(f) is separate from that of Ortiz, the Rule is a 
product of case law developed during the same period.48 
b. Rule 23(c) Revisions 
In 2003 the Advisory Committee revised two additional sections of 
Rule 23, which allowed for more restrictive application of the 
preconditions for class certification in sections (a) and (b).  First, the 
Committee altered the timing of the certification decision, no longer 
requiring that a court determine class action status “as soon as 
practicable” after a case is filed, but instead allowing a court to 
determine class action status “at an early practicable time” after filing.49  
Second, the Committee deleted language in Rule 23(c)(1)(C) that class 
certification “may be conditional,” stating in its Committee Note that a 
“court that is not satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been 
met should refuse certification until they have been met.”50  Read 
together, these provisions raised the standard for certifying a class from 
an early, conditional ruling to a later, relatively final decision.  They 
expanded the opportunity for parties to engage in discovery prior to 
moving for class certification and removed any pressure for the court to 
decide a motion to certify before being informed about, and even ruling 
on, the merits of the underlying claims.  One might reasonably expect 
that the rules would have the effect of restricting class certification 
because the presumption that a class would be certified preliminarily on 
a conditional basis was no longer available. 
c. Manual for Complex Litigation, Third and Fourth 
Standards for certifying class actions became more stringent during 
the period between promulgation of the Manual for Complex Litigation, 
Third (MCL, 3d) in 1995 and the Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth 
(MCL, 4th) in 2004.  Reflecting the case law at the time, the former had 
a pro-aggregation tilt, particularly in the sections dealing with mass torts.  
For example, the MCL, 3d started the discussion of class actions in mass 
                                                     
 47. Assuming, that is, that mandamus would be invoked “only in extraordinary cases.”  In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 48. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
 49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note. 
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note. 
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tort cases by asserting that, “[d]espite the Advisory Committee’s 1966 
caveat, courts have increasingly utilized class actions to avoid 
duplicative litigation in mass tort cases . . . .”51  The MCL, 3d went on to 
cite a host of mass tort “opt-out” cases that had been certified as class 
actions on both statewide and nationwide bases.52  The manual also 
stated “[i]n appropriate cases, common issues of fact or law have been 
carved out for class certification under Rule 23(c)(4)(A).”53 
In contrast, the current MCL, 4th begins its treatment of mass-tort 
class actions this way: 
Federal courts have “ordinarily” disfavored—but not ruled out 
entirely—using class actions in dispersed mass tort cases.  After 
experimentation with class treatment of some mass torts during the 
1980s and 1990s, the courts have greatly restricted its use in mass torts 
litigation.  Mass tort personal injury cases are rarely appropriate for 
class certification for trial. . . . Property damage claims may be 
different . . . .54 
The MCL, 4th also refers to certification of issues classes under Rule 
23(c)(4)(A) in conjunction with nonclass procedures for individual 
issues, but notes that in recent times, “questions have been raised about 
the constitutionality, fairness, and usefulness of issues classes in the mass 
tort context.”55 
The MCL, 4th’s bottom line tracks its opening line: class 
certification of mass-tort cases is disfavored, but not out of the question.  
Based on the current guidance to judges and practitioners in mass tort 
litigation, one would expect that class certification of mass-tort cases 
would have become rare indeed during the decade between the two most 
recent versions of the Manual for Complex Litigation. 
Scholarly commentary arriving after the 2004 publication of the 
MCL, 4th supports the conclusion that the certification decision is the 
key factor in analyzing the direction of class action litigation.  Professor 
Edward Sherman observed that a “number of federal courts have applied 
increasingly stringent requirements for class certification, particularly for 
cases arising in multiple states;”56 referenced “the aversion of many 
                                                     
 51. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 33.262 (1995) (citation omitted). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.7 (2004) (citations omitted). 
 55. Id. § 22.71 (citing Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748–51 (5th Cir. 1996); In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–1304 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 56. Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class Action is 
Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2206 (2008). 
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federal courts to class certification of multistate class actions”57; and 
concluded that, “in most mass tort cases today . . . , class certification is 
unlikely.”58  Along similar lines, Professor Richard Marcus launched his 
discussion of maximalist use of MDL procedures by quoting Judge 
Weinstein to the effect that “‘use of the class action device to aggregate 
claims has become more difficult.’”59 
All of the above—cases, commentary, and Rule changes—point in 
the direction of fewer certified classes.  This combination of factors 
makes it less likely that one could identify an Ortiz effect.  Instead, Ortiz 
should be understood as part of a larger trend in the class action 
context—a trend away from certified classes.  The next subpart examines 
the existing empirical studies of class certification.  What light can these 
studies shed on the perceived shift away from class certification and 
toward MDL aggregation? 
2. Empirical Research 
Empirical research on class certification is quite limited.  Until 
recently, the body of such research related exclusively to class actions in 
federal courts, which is the subject of this paper.  In this section, we 
discuss four federal studies, one of which dates from the 1970s.  It is 
impossible to infer a post-Ortiz trend from four data points, especially 
when the studies differ in many respects.  Moreover, none of the studies 
focused on mass-tort or PIPL cases.  Nonetheless, these studies warrant 
discussion.  Interestingly, the studies point toward more restrictive 
rulings on class certification over time.  One might reasonably expect 
this based on developing case law, rule changes, and guidance from the 
Manual for Complex Litigation—discussed above—as well as the 
Supreme Court decisions in Amchem and Ortiz.  But the paucity of data 
prevents us from drawing any firm conclusions. 
In addition to the following discussion, the four studies are 
summarized in appended Table 3.60  We also discuss two studies of state 
class action activity; one from California61 (California Study) and one 
                                                     
 57. Id. at 2207. 
 58. Id. at 2208. 
 59. Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use 
of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2249 (2008) (quoting 
In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
 60. See infra appended Table 3. 
 61. HILARY HEHMAN, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CLASS CERTIFICATION IN CALIFORNIA: 
SECOND INTERIM REPORT FROM THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION (2010), 
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/classaction-certification.pdf. 
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from Oklahoma.62  While not directly related to the shift in federal 
aggregate litigation, the California study suggests that state class 
certification activity may have followed a similar path to that observed in 
the federal courts—that is, more restrictive rulings in recent years.  
Likewise, Oklahoma state courts have experienced a decline in motions 
and class certifications since CAFA’s effective date of February 2005. 
The first study to examine the rate of class certification was 
conducted by the 1974 staff of the Georgetown Law Journal at the 
request of the Senate Commerce Committee, following the 1966 
adoption of Rule 23(b)(3).63  The study included “a comprehensive 
examination of all class actions filed in the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia between July 1, 1966 and December 31, 
1972.”64  Roughly two decades later, the FJC studied class actions 
terminated between July 1, 1992 and June 30, 1994 in four federal 
district courts with substantial class action activity: the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, the Northern District of California, the Northern 
District of Illinois, and the Southern District of Florida (1996 FJC).65  
That study encompassed all cases filed or litigated as class actions in 
those districts during the study period.  Nine years later, the FJC 
conducted a national case-based survey of attorneys in closed class 
action cases, using a database constructed by examining electronic 
docket records in all civil cases filed during the study period for evidence 
of class action activity (2005 FJC).  This study generated responses from 
a representative national sample of attorneys involved in class action 
terminations between July 1999 and December 2002.66  These three 
studies (1974 Georgetown, 1996 FJC, and 2005 FJC) did not limit their 
analysis to certain kinds of class actions.  The ongoing CAFA study, 
discussed above, divides class action cases broadly into federal-question 
and diversity class actions (2009 FJC).67  In what follows, we limit the 
discussion of that study to the diversity cases. 
                                                     
 62. Stephen S. Gensler, The Other Side of the CAFA Effect: An Empirical Analysis of Class 
Action Activity in the Oklahoma State Courts, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 809 (2010). 
 63. Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1123 (1974) 
[hereinafter 1974 Georgetown]. 
 64. Id. at 1126–27. 
 65. THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER, & ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1996) [hereinafter 
WILLGING ET AL., 1996 FJC]; see also Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 
to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 82 (1996) [hereinafter Willging et al., 
Empirical Analysis]. 
 66. WILLGING & WHEATMAN, EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION, supra note 29, at 6; see also 
Willging & Wheatman, Attorney Choice, supra note 29, at 601. 
 67. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Impact of the Class Action 
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a. Motions to Certify 
For a class certification ruling to exist, of course, counsel 
representing the putative class must, ordinarily, first file a motion to 
certify the class.  The percentages of cases in which motions were filed 
in the four studies ranges a great deal, from 70% of the cases in the 1996 
FJC study68 to just 24% in the 2009 CAFA study.69  The 1974 
Georgetown study found that motions to certify were filed in 51% of the 
cases studied.70  The 2005 FJC study did not ask directly about the filing 
of motions to certify, but instead asked attorneys to report court action on 
class certification; 43% reported court action on a motion, but the 
percentage of cases in which a motion was actually filed is likely 
higher.71  The California study found that “not only was the filing of 
motions for class certification relatively infrequent overall, but the data 
also show a consistent decrease in the yearly rate of these motions over 
the study period, declining sharply from 2000 to 2005.”72  The 
percentage of cases with certification motions ranged from over 25% in 
2000 to just over 5% in 2005.73  The Oklahoma study found a notable, 
but less steep, decline in certification motions, from 52% of all cases 
filed as class actions between January 1, 2001 and February 17, 2005 to 
33% of such cases filed between February 18, 2005 and December 31, 
2008.74 
These findings indicate that in a substantial portion of cases raising 
class allegations, no motion to certify the alleged class is ever filed.  In 
the most recent federal study, no motion to certify was filed in three 
quarters of the putative class actions.  Even at the high end, in the 1996 
FJC study, no motion to certify was filed in 30% of cases.  Rule 
23(c)(1)(A), as amended in 2003,75 permits counsel to wait for an “early 
                                                                                                                       
Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: Preliminary Findings from Phase Two’s Pre-CAFA Sample of 
Diversity Class Actions, 256 F.R.D. 214, 214 (2009). 
 68. Of the 407 cases, 286 (70%) had at least one motion to certify a class.  WILLGING ET AL., 
1996 FJC, supra note 65, at 26; see also Willging et al., Empirical Analysis, supra note 65, at 101. 
 69. This is the percentage of all cases in the sample that had one or more motions to certify a 
class.  Lee & Willging, supra note 67, at 219 tbl.4. 
 70. Of the 81 terminated cases, 41 (51%) included a motion for or against class certification, 15 
of which were filed by a defendant.  1974 Georgetown, supra note 63, at 1142–43. 
 71. This is the percentage of all attorneys who reported court action on class certification; of 
the 57% with no action reported, there may or may not have been a motion to certify.  WILLGING & 
WHEATMAN, EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION, supra note 29, at 47; Willging & Wheatman, Attorney 
Choice, supra note 29, at 645. 
 72. HEHMAN, supra note 61, at 9 fig.2. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Gensler, supra note 62, at 838 tbl. 3. 
 75. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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practicable time” before filing such a motion, and the California rule 
calls for the filing of a motion for certification “‘when practicable.’”76  
The federal rule change likely delays the filing of certification motions 
and thus makes the filing of any such motion less likely, overall.  The 
California rule seems even more likely to tolerate delaying or not filing a 
motion to certify. 
b. Rulings on Motions 
All four federal studies found that when a judge ruled on a motion to 
certify, the most likely ruling was to grant the motion.77  The CAFA 
study found that the grant rate was 63%,78 the 2005 FJC study 56%,79 the 
1996 FJC study 67%,80 and the 1974 Georgetown study 66%.81  These 
grant rates, combined with fewer motions to certify filed in later studies, 
have resulted in very different percentages of cases filed with class 
allegations that eventuate in a certified class.  The 1974 Georgetown 
study, which had motions in about half the cases and a high grant rate, 
found that 27% of the cases filed as class actions saw a class certified.82  
The 1996 FJC study, with motions filed in most cases and a relatively 
high grant rate, found that 37% of putative class actions resulted in a 
certified class.83  The 2005 FJC study, with motions activity in fewer 
cases, compared to earlier studies, and the lowest of the four grant rates, 
found that 24% of putative class actions resulted in a certified class.84  
                                                     
 76. HEHMAN, supra note 61, at 4 (citing CAL. R. OF CT. 3.764). 
 77. These percentages do not include cases in which there was no ruling on a motion to certify 
a class.  In a sizeable number of cases courts take no action on class certification before the case is 
resolved.  See, e.g., WILLGING & WHEATMAN, EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION, supra note 29, at 35 tbl.9 
(showing that 163 of 283 cases (58%), many of which had no motion to certify, had no action taken 
on class certification). 
 78. This is the percentage of all rulings on motions to certify a class, excluding orders deferring 
a ruling or finding the motion to be moot.  Lee & Willging, supra note 67, at 224 tbl.9. 
 79. This is the percentage of the 43% of attorneys who reported court action on class 
certification: 56 percent of the rulings were to certify a class.  WILLGING & WHEATMAN, EMPIRICAL 
EXAMINATION, supra note 29, at 47; Willging & Wheatman, Attorney Choice, supra note 29, at 645. 
 80. Of the 228 cases with at least one motion to certify a class and a ruling on class 
certification, 152 (67%) were certified.  WILLGING ET AL., 1996 FJC, supra note 65, at 26–27; see 
also Willging et al., Empirical Analysis, supra note 65, at 101. 
 81. Of the 41 terminated cases that included a decision on a motion or a sua sponte ruling for or 
against class certification, 27 (66%) were certified and 14 (34%) denied certification.  1974 
Georgetown, supra note 63, at 1142–43 & n.114. 
 82. Id. at 1137 (reporting class relief in 21 of 81 cases). 
 83. WILLGING ET AL., 1996 FJC, supra note 65, at 7. 
 84. Of 486 cases, 119 (24%) were certified.  WILLGING & WHEATMAN, EMPIRICAL 
EXAMINATION, supra note 29, at 50 tbl.19.  For diversity cases, 22% of the non-remanded cases 
were certified.  Id. at 35 tbl.9. 
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The CAFA study, with motions to certify filed in only about a quarter of 
cases, found that only 13% of cases filed as class actions resulted in a 
certified class of some type.85 
The California study found that 44% of motions for certification 
were granted and that the overall rate of class certification was 12.8%.86  
In Oklahoma, the grant rates were 58% between January 2001 and 
February 2005 and 41–48% from February 2005 through December 
2008.87 
c. Certification for Litigation or Settlement 
Historically, courts certified class actions without restriction.  
Commentators now often refer to such cases as “litigation classes” to 
distinguish them from classes certified for settlement purposes only 
(settlement classes).  Prior to the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, which 
allowed judges and litigants more flexibility in the timing of the 
certification decision,88 the Manual for Complex Litigation cautioned 
judges against certifying settlement classes.  For example, the Manual for 
Complex Litigation, Second, published in 1985, stated that “courts have 
permitted, with great caution, the use of ‘settlement classes.’”89  In 
contrast, the current Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth, published in 
2004, states that “[s]ettlement classes . . . can provide significant benefits 
to class members and enable the defendants to achieve final resolution of 
multiple suits.”90  The changes in the Rules and the Manual for Complex 
Litigation open the door for more settlement-class certifications. 
Each of the federal empirical studies found a lower percentage of 
litigation classes and a higher percentage of settlement classes than its 
predecessor.  The 1974 Georgetown study found that 89% of the classes 
certified were litigation classes.91  The 1996 FJC study found that 61% of 
certified classes were litigation classes.92  The 2005 FJC study found that 
                                                     
 85. This is the percentage of the 161 nonremanded cases in the study, excluding all cases in 
which the court remanded the case to a state court.  Lee & Willging, supra note 67, at 224 tbl.9.  If 
all 231 cases in the sample are included, only 9% were certified as class actions.  Id. 
 86. HEHMAN, supra note 61, at 8, 10 tbl.5. 
 87. Gensler, supra note 62, at 839 & n.121. 
 88. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 89. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) §30.45 (1985) (citations omitted). 
 90. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.612 (2004).  The Manual also cautions 
judges that “[c]lass actions certified solely for settlement, particularly early in the case, sometimes 
make meaningful judicial review more difficult and more important.”  Id. 
 91. 1974 Georgetown, supra note 63, at 1142–43.  Including 5 cases without formal motions 
yields 24 litigation classes and 3 settlement classes.  Id. at 1142 n.114. 
 92. WILLGING ET AL., 1996 FJC, supra note 65, at 26 (finding 93 of 152 cases (61%) certified 
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42% of certified classes were litigation classes.93  The CAFA study 
found that 20% of certified classes were litigation classes.94  The 
California study found that 22% of classes certified between 2000 and 
2005 were certified as a result of a contested motion.95  In Oklahoma, 
54% of the pre-CAFA certifications were litigation classes, and that 
percentage remained relatively constant at 53% after CAFA (but with a 
much smaller number of certified classes).96  Although these findings, by 
themselves, do not establish a trend, they do seem to indicate that the 
litigation class, once the norm, has become relatively uncommon in 
federal courts as well as in California and Oklahoma. 
When complete, the CAFA study will shed additional light on these 
issues.  To date, we have collected data on 669 terminated class actions 
based on diversity jurisdiction that were initiated in federal court in the 
period February 2003–February 2007.  A relatively large percentage of 
the sampled diversity cases remains pending, as of the last update (about 
20% of the post CAFA cases).  But a preliminary analysis is possible, 
with respect to class settlement rates in general and personal injury cases 
in particular.  To date, none of the diversity class actions in the sample 
has terminated by trial; the nontrial class actions include, needless to say, 
any case in which a litigation class has been certified.  That may change 
as additional cases terminate.  But as of this writing, the result in every 
terminated case with a certified class has been class settlement.97 
d. Personal-Injury Class Actions 
Does it matter whether the case ending in a class settlement raised 
personal-injury claims?  The CAFA study includes information 
categorizing every state-law claim raised in the complaints in sampled 
cases, permitting us to identify cases raising one or more personal-injury 
claims.  Slightly more than one in eight (ninety-seven cases, or 14.5%) of 
the terminated diversity class actions raised one or more state-law claim 
classified as “tort personal injury” (a somewhat broader category than 
mass torts or products liability).  Interestingly, the class settlement rate 
                                                                                                                       
unconditionally); see also Willging et al., Empirical Analysis, supra note 65, at 101. 
 93. WILLGING & WHEATMAN, EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION, supra note 29, at 48 tbl.18 (reporting 
52 of 125 (42%) cases certified for trial and litigation); see also Willging & Wheatman, Attorney 
Choice, supra note 29, at 647 tbl.20 (same). 
 94. Lee & Willging, supra note 67, at 224. 
 95. HEHMAN, supra note 61, at 11 tbl.6. 
 96. Gensler, supra note 62, at 842 tbl. 6. 
 97. Lee & Willging, supra note 67, at 227 (“Every case in which a motion to certify was 
granted, unconditionally or for settlement purposes, resulted in a class settlement.”). 
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for terminated cases raising one or more personal-injury claims and those 
not raising such a claim is identical—10.3%.  Ten of 97 terminated class 
actions raising one or more state-law personal-injury claims resulted in a 
class settlement.  Fifty-nine of 572 terminated class actions not raising a 
state-law personal-injury claim resulted in a class settlement.  This 
finding is preliminary and is likely to change when all cases in the 
sample have terminated.  It suggests, however, that class settlement is not 
necessarily a less likely outcome of class actions raising personal-injury 
claims, compared with other diversity class actions—even in the post-
Amchem, post-Ortiz era. 
In sum, the existing empirical evidence is consistent with the thesis 
that class certification has become less likely in the post-Ortiz period.  
Moreover, the settlement class—at issue in both Amchem and Ortiz—
appears to have displaced the litigation class as the dominant form of 
class certification.  Interestingly, the most recent evidence suggests that 
cases raising state-law personal-injury claims have not fared differently 
when compared with cases raising other kinds of claims.  Any trends that 
do exist in class certification and settlement rates, in other words, may 
not be limited to personal-injury or mass-tort cases. 
III. MDL AGGREGATION 
In this Part we address the increasing importance of MDL 
aggregation in the mass-torts and PIPL area.98  Although the original 
proponents of the MDL process included products-liability cases on their 
list of case types in which “massive filings of multidistrict litigation are 
reasonably certain to occur,”99 MDL consolidation of large numbers of 
products-liability cases into mammoth MDL proceedings is a more 
recent phenomenon.  Prior to 1990, for example, the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) ordered the consolidation of only six 
products-liability MDL proceedings.  Those consolidations accounted for 
just 27% of the twenty-two products-liability proceedings that the JPML 
considered during its first twenty-one years of existence.100  Up until 
                                                     
 98. See generally Symposium, The Problem of Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2199 
(2008); see also DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL: PRACTICE BEFORE THE 
JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (2006); Robert A. Cahn, A Look at the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 72 F.R.D. 211 (1976–77). 
 99. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1900 (Statement of 
the Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the U. S. District Courts). 
 100. This section analyzes data provided to the FJC by the clerk’s office at the JPML.  The 
databases analyzed contain records for MDL proceedings and records for cases in the federal courts 
that the JPML has considered making part of an MDL proceeding.  We use the term “case” to 
distinguish these actions from “proceedings,” the term we use to identify MDL consolidations.  As 
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1990, in other words, the JPML considered about one products liability 
proceeding per year, on average, and declined to order consolidation of 
the overwhelming majority of those it did consider. 
It is the more recent development of mammoth MDL proceedings 
that has spurred discussion of a shift toward MDL aggregation.  In fact, 
some commentators have concluded that the “preferred way of handling 
mass tort lawsuits in the federal courts has been for the [JPML] to 
transfer and consolidate the cases in a single district court.”101  In the 
nineteen years between the beginning of 1990 and the end of 2008, the 
JPML ordered consolidation of 112 products-liability MDL proceedings.  
During that period, the JPML considered at least 154 such proceedings, 
for a grant rate of 73%.  In short, the JPML has become much more 
likely to order consolidation of products-liability proceedings—almost 
three times as likely to consolidate—at the same time as the number of 
products-liability proceedings has increased.  From 1990 through 2008, 
the JPML considered eight products-liability proceedings per year, on 
average. 
But to be clear, MDL aggregation is not exactly an alternative to 
class action aggregation of claims.  Cases consolidated in an MDL 
proceeding may, and often do, raise class allegations, and an MDL 
proceeding can very well result in a class settlement, as discussed below.  
Moreover, the JPML has expressed a strong preference for ordering the 
consolidation of proceedings where the potential transferee cases raise 
class allegations: “a potential for conflicting and overlapping class 
actions presents one of the strongest reasons for transferring such related 
actions to a single district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial 
proceedings.”102  Whether the presence of a class allegation actually 
increases the likelihood of an MDL consolidation is an interesting 
question for further empirical investigation. 
This Part will proceed in a somewhat backwards fashion.  First, we 
will discuss MDL cases, with the purpose of establishing the mammoth 
size of a few of these MDL proceedings and of documenting the 
proportion of products-liability cases these few proceedings constitute.  
Then, we turn to the proceedings themselves and the issues they raise. 
                                                                                                                       
of the end of 2008, for example, there were 28,360 JPML case dispositions in MDL 926 (In re 
Silicon Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation), a single MDL proceeding. 
 101. Silver & Miller, supra note 9, at 3. 
 102. In re Plumbing Fixtures, 308 F. Supp. 242, 244 (J.P.M.L. 1970) (rejecting argument that 
putative transferor court should decide class certification question), cited in DAVID F. HERR, 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL § 5:24 (2007); see also HERR, supra, § 5:24 n.1 (noting a 
string of decisions of the Judicial Panel between 1968 and 2006 standing for the same proposition). 
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A. Products-Liability MDL Cases 
Figure 2 displays the total number of JPML case dispositions in 
nonasbestos products-liability (NAPL) cases, 1991–2008.103  By 
“disposition,” we refer to the JPML’s decision whether to make a case a 
part of a new or ongoing MDL proceeding.  The figure includes case 
dispositions that did not result in the case being consolidated into an 
MDL proceeding.  This is a relatively minor point, however, because 
95.5% of all JPML dispositions in NAPL cases resulted in the case 
becoming part of an MDL proceeding.  At minimum, to be included in 
the figure, a case had to be similar enough to other cases for the JPML to 
consider consolidating it with at least some other cases in an MDL 
proceeding. 
The number of NAPL MDL case dispositions represented in Figure 
2, as with PIPL filings in Figure 1, fluctuates a great deal from year to 
year.  The line spikes in 1995, breaking through the 10,000-cases mark 
for the first time.  It is worth emphasizing that point—in 1995, the JPML 
disposed of more than 10,000 NAPL cases.  The line in Figure 2 ebbs 
after 1997–98 but spikes again in 2004, breaking through the 20,000-
cases mark.  In other words, the JPML disposed of more than 20,000 
NAPL cases in 2004.  The year 2004 saw a massive influx of NAPL 
filings and a correspondingly high number of MDL dispositions of 
NAPL cases.  The line then fluctuates—remaining, however, at relatively 
high levels.  In 2008, the number of MDL case dispositions in NAPL 
cases was greater than in each year prior to 2004, except 1995. 
                                                     
 103. This figure and Table 1 present data provided to the FJC by the clerk’s office at the JPML.  
See also note 100. The JPML automated its records in 1992; the Cases database is incomplete prior 
to that date.  The data point for 1991 probably understates the number of NAPL cases disposed of in 
that year and should be interpreted with caution. 
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Table 1 lists the three largest MDL proceedings in every year, 1992–
2008, in terms of case dispositions, as well as the overall number of 
NAPL case dispositions per year.  A quick look at the table indicates that 
Figure 2 can be broken into two distinct periods.  In the period 1992–98, 
the line is driven overwhelmingly by one massive MDL proceeding: 
MDL 926 (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability 
Litigation).  In these seven years, MDL 926 cases represented 71.9% of 
all NAPL MDL cases disposed of by the JPML (28,082 out of 39,062 
total NAPL cases).  The peak observed in 1995 in Figure 2, as well as the 
shoulders in 1993–94 and, to a lesser extent, in 1996–97, represent 
Breast Implant cases.  During that seven-year period, the next largest 
consolidation, MDL 1038 (In re Norplant Contraceptive Products 
Liability Litigation), accounted for 10.1% of NAPL MDL case 
dispositions, and the third largest, MDL 1014 (In re Orthopedic Bone 
Screw Products Liability Litigation), accounted for 8%. 
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In contrast, Table 1 also shows that no single MDL proceeding 
dominated the ten-year period 1999–2008 in the way that MDL 926 
0.6.0_WILLGING FINAL 5/12/2010  1:55:18 PM 
798 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
dominated 1992–98.  The best candidate for that role is MDL 1203 (In re 
Diet Drugs Products Liability Litigation).  Diet Drugs was the largest 
MDL proceeding in terms of number of MDL case dispositions after 
1998; it accounted for 21.5% of all NAPL MDL case dispositions, or 
20,161 out of 93,985 cases, from 1999 through 2008.  There were, 
however, fewer Diet Drugs dispositions in 1999–2008 than Breast 
Implants dispositions in 1992–98.  Moreover, unlike Breast Implants, 
Diet Drugs had company.  In the peak year 2004 and in the years since, 
the relatively large numbers of MDL case dispositions are the result of 
Diet Drugs and five other MDL proceedings: MDL 1431 (In re Baycol 
Products Liability Litigation), MDL 1507 (In re Phenylpropanolamine 
(PPA) Products Liability Litigation), MDL 1535 (In re Welding Fume 
Products Liability Litigation), MDL 1657 (In re Vioxx Marketing, Sales 
Practices Products Liability Litigation), and MDL 1769 (In re Seroquel 
Products Liability Litigation).  Together, these MDL proceedings 
accounted for 71.7% of the NAPL MDL cases during this ten-year 
period—comparable to MDL 926 in the earlier period. 
The relatively large numbers of products-liability MDL cases in 
recent years, in other words, have not been concentrated in one massive 
proceeding, like MDL 875 (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) 
or MDL 926 (Breast Implants).  In many of the years in the period 1999–
2008, no single MDL proceeding accounts for a majority of NAPL MDL 
cases.  Diet Drugs accounted for a majority of NAPL cases in 1999 and 
2000 (67.7% and 60.9%, respectively), and Baycol accounted for a 
majority in 2002 and 2003 (55.3% and 58.4%, respectively).  But in 
2004–08, no MDL proceeding accounted for a majority of NAPL 
cases—although at 46.5% in 2007, Seroquel came close.  In terms of 
aggregate litigation, in short, the period 2004–08 saw a greater number 
of NAPL MDL cases, spread across more proceedings, than the earlier 
period; the last few years have seen a massive increase in MDL 
aggregate litigation. 
B. MDL Proceedings 
In recent years, the MDL process has played an increasingly 
important role in the management and resolution of products-liability 
litigations.  Beginning with the Judicial Conference of the United States 
(JCUS) Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation in 1991,104 which 
                                                     
 104. REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S. (Mar. 12, 1991), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/91-Mar.pdf. 
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“concluded that no adequate procedures presently exist to enable the 
justice system to deal with the unique nature of asbestos cases,” the 
JCUS signaled to the Judicial Panel that mass-tort litigation posed 
serious challenges for the civil justice system that might be remedied by 
aggregating multiple claims.105  The JCUS urged Congress to “consider 
legislation expressly to authorize consolidation and collective trial of 
asbestos cases in order to expedite disposition of cases in federal courts 
with heavy asbestos personal injury caseloads.”106  In the absence of 
congressional action, the JPML took the lead and consolidated all 
pending asbestos cases and transferred them to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania for pretrial proceedings.107  That proceeding, in fact, led to 
the settlement proposed in Amchem.108  The Panel’s action regarding 
asbestos reversed a series of five decisions between 1977 and 1987 in 
which the Panel declined to consolidate asbestos cases.109  The 1991 
decision appears to have opened the door to consolidation of products-
liability cases at the increased rate described above. 
Empirical attention to the increasing MDL activity regarding 
products-liability litigation has been sparse.  A 1999 FJC study, 
conducted for the Chief Justice’s Mass Torts Working Group, examined 
twenty-four mass-tort, personal-injury litigations and found that the 
JPML had transferred fifteen of them (between 1968 and 1999).110  More 
recently, Professor Deborah Hensler combined the results of that FJC 
study with the results of a mass-tort study conducted by RAND and 
concluded that “[h]alf (seventeen) of the mass personal injury litigations 
identified by the studies were consolidated and transferred to a single 
federal court under the multi-district statute.”111  She found that “[o]nly 
one-third (twelve) were resolved wholly or to a significant degree by a 
class action settlement . . . . But about two-thirds (twenty-two) . . . 
resulted in aggregate settlements, including both class and non-class 
global settlements that were intended to resolve all current claims against 
                                                     
 105. Id. at 33. 
 106. Id. 
 107. In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 416 (J.P.M.L. 1991). 
 108. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 257–61 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 
F.3d 610 (3rd Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 109. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. at 417 & n.4. 
 110. Thomas Willging, et al., Individual Characteristics of Mass Tort Case Congregations: A 
Report to the Mass Tort Working Group, in Appendix D, Working Group on Mass Torts 7–8 (1999), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/masstapd.pdf/$file/masstapd.pdf.  Two of the twenty-six 
case congregations identified in the report preceded the creation of the Panel and thus were not 
included in the twenty-four reported above. 
 111. Hensler, Fat Lady, supra note 10, at 896, 903. 
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the defendant(s) . . . .”112  Thus, even before any possible impact of 
Amchem and Ortiz, the MDL processes played a major role in resolving 
products-liability mass-tort litigation. 
Hensler also examined ten products liability litigations filed between 
1999 and 2007 and found that all ten had been consolidated by the 
JPML.113  Those proceedings produced a range of outcomes from 
summary judgment through mixed individual and aggregate settlements 
to aggregate settlements.114  Four of the litigations were ongoing at the 
time of her publication.115  Three of the aggregate settlements (Baycol, 
PPA, and Sulzer Inter-Op Implant) included use of the class action 
device and two settlements (Ephedra and Zyprexa) did not.116 
As noted by Hensler, Ephedra included a series of consolidated 
settlements against individual defendants, resolving hundreds of claims 
in each instance.117  Prior to those settlements—and perhaps motivating 
the choice of consolidation rather than class settlement—the presiding 
MDL transferee judge denied a motion to certify a proposed settlement-
only class consisting of 170 personal-injury claimants with cases against 
defendant Metabolite International, Inc.118  The court held that (1) joinder 
of all claimants was practical because they had already filed suit;119 (2) 
the proposed class was not cohesive enough to satisfy the Amchem 
criteria;120 and (3) the class action procedure was not a superior 
procedure given the alternative of using the MDL process and an 
equivalent process in California.121  The court also noted that the parties 
sought to “have the [c]ourt in effect invent, purportedly under Rule 23 
and the All Writs Act, an alternative to the Bankruptcy Code for granting 
Metabolite a stay of litigation and discharge of liability while affording 
only one class of potential creditors an equitable share of Metabolite’s 
limited assets.”122  After that opinion, it is not surprising that other 
                                                     
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 911–16. 
 114. Id. at 917. 
 115. Id. at 913–16. 
 116. Id.  Note that the Vioxx litigation resulted in a nonclass MDL settlement after the article 
was published.  See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657, 2008 WL 4681368, at *9–13 
(E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2008) (striking class action certification). 
 117. Hensler, Fat Lady, supra note 10, at 913–14 tbl.2 & nn.111–13 (reporting settlements of 
140, 256, and 126 personal injury and wrongful death claims in three settlements). 
 118. In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., 231 F.R.D. 167, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 119. Id. at 171. 
 120. Id. at 169–71. 
 121. Id. at 171.  State courts in California had 90 of the 130 pending state-court cases.  See id. at 
168, 171. 
 122. Id. at 169. 
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plaintiffs and defendants in the MDL litigation recognized the futility of 
invoking the class action procedure for their settlements and turned 
instead to nonclass consolidated settlements, giving up any prospect of 
res judicata being applied to the class of claimants. 
The Zyprexa and Ephedra settlements, as well as the more recent 
Guidant and Vioxx settlements, suggest that the MDL process has 
supplemented and perhaps displaced the class action device as a 
procedural mechanism for large settlements.  Indeed, District Judge Jack 
Weinstein observed in 1994 that “[w]hat is clear from the huge 
consolidation required in mass torts is that they have many of the 
characteristics of class actions. . . . It is my conclusion . . . that mass 
consolidations are in effect quasi-class actions.”123  Professors Silver and 
Miller, following Judge Weinstein’s lead, refer to these aggregated, 
multidistrict mass-tort settlements as “quasi-class actions.”124 
Neither the MDL statute nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
include any requirement that the court review a consolidated settlement, 
even an opt-in settlement negotiated by attorneys in the proceeding.  The 
presumption is that the attorneys for the individual plaintiffs will 
represent the plaintiffs’ interests adequately.  In the Zyprexa litigation, 
Judge Weinstein approved a settlement with an estimated value of $700 
million on behalf of 8,000 individual claimants with alleged personal 
injuries resulting from using the prescription drug Zyprexa.125  Recall 
that the class settlement that Judge Weinstein approved in the Agent 
Orange litigation amounted to $180 million for a class with 240,000 
claimants, much smaller both in total value and in the average recovery 
per claimant than the settlement in the Zyprexa MDL.126  In the Agent 
Orange case, Judge Weinstein, after holding hearings before Vietnam 
veterans in five cities, wrote an extensive opinion upholding class 
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) and approving the class settlement as 
fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23(e);127 that opinion was 
reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and affirmed 
after extensive discussion.128  In contrast, Judge Weinstein approved a 
special master’s report on the Zyprexa settlement in an unpublished two-
paragraph order issued after a brief hearing on the proposed 
                                                     
 123. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 480–
81 (1994). 
 124. Silver & Miller, supra note 9, at 2. 
 125. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 126. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 127. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 763–64 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 
818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 128. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d at 151–52. 
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settlement.129  Along the same lines, the Vioxx settlement appears to have 
been administered in a transparent fashion by the court, but it does not 
appear that the court exercised any independent review of the fairness, 
reasonableness, or adequacy of the terms of the settlement or the process 
that led to the agreement.130 
Table 2 lays out the size of the awards and the number of claimants 
in three of the four nonclass mass-tort settlements discussed above.131  
All three settlement amounts are comparable in size to class action 
settlements.  Surely, these cases also meet Rule 23(a)(1)’s numerosity 
requirement, and the number of claimants is comparable to the number of 
claimants in mass-tort class action settlements of yore. 
None of this, of course, is to say that the settlements in the MDL 
proceedings were not fair, reasonable, or adequate to the settling parties.  
We have not engaged in any such analysis of the terms of the 
settlements.  But, except for the attorneys and litigants involved in the 
settlements, neither has anyone else been required to do so.  That’s the 
point of the next section. 
 
Table 2: Number of Claimants and Gross Value of Settlements in 
Three Recent Multidistrict Consolidated Settlements 
 
Name of case Number of claimants Gross value of 
settlement 
Zyprexa 8,000132 $690 million133 
Vioxx 48,507134 $4.85 billion135 
Guidant136 8,500137 $240 million138 
                                                     
 129. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-01596, 2005 WL 3117302, at *1 (E.D.N.Y 
Nov. 22, 2005).  At the hearing Judge Weinstein reviewed the settlement with Special Master 
Kenneth R. Feinberg and suggested substantial changes.  Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Zyprexa, 
2005 WL 3117302 (2005), 2005 WL 6191038.  The transcript of the hearing consisted of twenty-
nine pages.  Id. 
 130. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 552–53 (E.D. La. 2009) 
(explaining court’s role in Vioxx Settlement Agreement). 
 131. See supra notes 117–22 and accompanying text for discussion of the multiple settlements in 
the Ephedra litigation. 
 132. Alex Berenson, Lilly to Pay $690 Million in Drug Suits, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2005, at C6. 
 133. Id. 
 134. BROWNGREER PLC, CLAIMS ADMINISTRATOR COURT REPORT NO. 21, at 4, available at 
http://www.browngreer.com/vioxxsettlement/images/pdfs/mdlreport_091709.pdf (last visited Apr. 
13 2010). 
 135. Master Settlement Agreement at 2, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (Nov. 9, 
2007), available at http://www.browngreer.com/vioxxsettlement/images/pdfs/mastersa.pdf. 
 136. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 973 (D. 
Minn. 2007). 
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C. Procedural Questions 
This subpart poses, at a broad level, some of the procedural questions 
implicated by the nonclass aggregation process.  Civil proceduralists 
have observed that few, if any, of the special procedural protections 
available to class members are afforded to litigants who settle their cases 
in a nonclass consolidated settlement.139  Professor Howard Erichson 
succinctly summarizes the current state of affairs: “Class actions get all 
the attention.”140  And, one might add, class actions get all the procedural 
protections.  Suffice it to say that our procedural rules have drawn a 
sharp distinction between class action litigation and nonclass aggregate 
representation of a large group of individuals.  The result has been to 
attempt to force nonclass settlements “awkwardly within either the class 
action device or the traditional model of the one-on-one lawsuit” when 
they are in fact hybrids of the two litigation models.141 
As the above discussion of the Zyprexa, Vioxx, and Guidant 
litigations demonstrates, nonclass aggregate settlements can rival class 
action settlements in the size of the award and the number of claimants 
sharing in it.  Amchem devoted considerable attention to the adequacy of 
representation of class members and found it wanting in the context of 
that sprawling settlement.142  Nonclass aggregation proceeds on the 
unexamined assumption that individual plaintiffs joined together in 
consolidated litigation are adequately represented by individual counsel 
or by a plaintiff management committee (PMC) appointed by the judge 
presiding over multidistrict proceedings.143  In the latter cases, judges 
typically address adequacy of representation at the time of appointment 
and not after a settlement has been reached.144  Attorney-fee awards 
                                                                                                                       
 137. Guidant Defibrillator Settlement Increased to $240 M, Online Lawyer Source, Nov. 20, 
2007, http://www.onlinelawyersource.com/news/guidant-settlement-increa.html. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Burch, Procedural Justice, supra note 11, at 4 (“[N]onclass aggregate 
litigation . . . is afforded none of the judicial quality control measures in Rule 23 that cushion and 
protect class members.”); see also Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 10, at 519 
(“[O]utside of class actions, the profession’s failure to recognize the collective nature of much 
litigation has left clients unprotected . . . .”). 
 140. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 10, at 519. 
 141. Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation 62 (Vand. Univ. Law Sch. 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 09-24), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract_id=1506460. 
 142. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–28 (1997). 
 143. Silver & Miller, supra note 9, at 9–12 (discussing the selection of counsel and appointment 
of committees). 
 144. See, e.g., BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES, 21, 30 (2d ed. 2009) (stating 
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remain for the court to resolve, but such decisions examine the merits of 
any settlement from a different perspective than would be the case in 
reviewing a class settlement as in Amchem. 
Likewise, notice to the litigants and an opportunity to present any 
objections to the settlement is not contemplated, because each plaintiff is 
represented by counsel and is presumed to have no need for notice 
beyond that given to their counsel.  Parties may object, in practice, by 
refusing to opt in or agree to the proposed settlement, of course.  Clients 
may express any objections to their attorneys in the privacy of their 
consultations.  But how much do we know about how attorneys and 
clients interact in the aggregate context, where attorneys may represent 
large numbers of clients with similar claims?  The fairness, 
reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement are left to the agreement 
of the parties without the special judicial oversight afforded to class 
action settlements. 
The end result of the MDL process is that the parties have the benefit 
of a procedure facilitated by the courts to aggregate cases and establish 
the framework for a settlement without any independent review of the 
terms of the settlement.  Judges and rule-makers, with the aid of 
academic commentators, have developed elaborate guidelines and rules 
of thumb to curb potential abuses associated with aggregate litigation 
taking the form of a class action.145  From that angle, the availability of 
nonclass settlement procedures seems to provide opportunities, and 
perhaps incentives, for the parties to avoid the class action process while 
retaining the more-or-less-global settlement benefits of aggregate federal 
litigation. 
Embedded in the assumption that individual plaintiffs are adequately 
represented by counsel (who sometimes have inventories of hundreds or 
even thousands of cases) is the assumption that ethical norms and 
attorney integrity will suffice to protect individual clients.146  One 
commentator concludes that “we can accomplish the same objectives [of 
protecting litigant autonomy] by looking to lawyers’ professional 
obligations concerning conflicts of interest and aggregate settlements.”147  
By applying relevant rules of professional conduct, that commentator 
asserts, “lawyers can create opportunities for autonomous client 
                                                                                                                       
that “settlement terms of a settlement class action need careful scrutiny” and “judges should avoid 
rigid adherence” to formulas in calculating attorney’s fees). 
 145. See, e.g., id. 
 146. See generally Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 10 (examining how the duties 
of attorneys compare with the procedures specified in the rules governing class actions). 
 147. Id. at 529. 
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decisions at the outset and at settlement, as a substitute for client 
autonomy in the course of litigation and negotiation.”148  But how often 
are ethical norms enforced, either through disciplinary proceedings or in 
private litigation over nonclass settlements?  At the least, empirical 
research into how well ethical norms protect individual litigants in such 
cases seems warranted. 
What, if any, rules and procedures should be developed to protect the 
individual whose attorneys do not, for whatever reasons, choose to 
follow the professional norms for handling aggregate settlements outside 
of the class action context?  Proposing specific regulations for nonclass 
settlements exceeds the scope of this article.  The American Law 
Institute (ALI), in its Proposed Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation, noted that “a fresh look needs to be taken at how non-class 
aggregate settlements should be regulated.”149  The ALI posits the 
circumstances required for aggregate settlements to be enforceable and 
binding on the parties, including consideration of “whether, based on all 
the facts and circumstances, the agreement is fair and reasonable.”150  
One of the factors informing the determination of fairness and 
reasonableness is “whether the terms of the settlement were reviewed by 
a neutral third party.”151  Those terms will, of course, only apply if there 
is a dispute about enforceability.  Unlike the treatment of class actions, 
there is no routine review of the fairness, adequacy, or reasonableness of 
the settlement or of the process for obtaining the consent of parties to the 
settlement. 
Professor Richard Nagareda, one of the ALI reporters, but writing in 
his personal capacity, advocates a broad approach to the regulation of 
new forms of aggregation like nonclass aggregate settlements, an 
approach “that exposes hybrids of traditional litigation features with 
aggregate ones and that, then, seeks to regulate them as such, not to fit 
them awkwardly within either the class action device or the traditional 
model of the one-on-one lawsuit.”152  Under that approach, class actions 
should no longer get all the attention of proceduralists, rulemakers, and 
regulators. 
                                                     
 148. Id. 
 149. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.15 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2008).  For a discussion of the adequacy of the representation standard in the Proposed Final Draft, 
see Patrick Woolley, Collateral Attack and the Role of Adequate Representation in Class Suits for 
Money Damages, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 917 (2010). 
 150. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 149, § 3.17(d). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Nagareda, supra note 141, at 62. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Empirical findings suggest several shifts in practice appearing to lead 
to the current use of nonclass settlements to resolve mass-tort litigation.  
The class action litigation landscape shifted in relation to changes in case 
law and governing rules of procedure.  Though the number of PIPL class 
action lawsuits has shifted very little, the percentage in which a party 
files a motion to certify a class that a court grants for litigation purposes 
appears to have shrunk markedly.  And, while the shift in class 
certification was taking place, the JPML began transferring products-
liability litigations to single courts for consolidated management at a 
higher rate, and the number of products-liability consolidated cases 
expanded.  As the class certification hurdles were raised, creative 
lawyers noticed that there are few, if any, practical barriers to aggregate 
non-class settlements.  The end result is to leave the interests of plaintiffs 
in these mass-tort contexts solely in the hands of their attorneys, with no 
systematic judicial or other regulatory oversight.  The ultimate question 
is whether that result is a fair, reasonable, and adequate treatment of 
those litigants. 
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